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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
CLAIR R. ROGERS,
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Respondent and Cross Appellant

vs.

Case No.
11875

FRANCES J. ROGERS ANDREWS,
Defendant and Appellant

----oOu-----

STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE
This is a child custody case arising out of the
plaintiff father's petition to have custody of his two
minor sons, now of the ages of thirteen and ten, awarded
to him; and also, concerning the District Court awarding to defendant mother certain visitation rights over
each week-end.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Trial Court granted plaintiff father's petition
awarding the custody of the two minor sons, Kim and
Robyn, of the ages thirteen and ten respectively, to
plaintiff, and awarding to defendant the right to take
said children each weekend from Saturday through
Sunday.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Plaintiff and Cross Appellant prays that the Judgment awarding custody of the two minor sons to plaintiff be affirmed, but that the Judgment of the Trial
Court awarding to the defendant mother each weekend from Saturday at 6 :00 o'clock P.M. to the following
Sunday at 9 :00 o'clock P.M. be reversed.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff agrees substantially with the Statement
of Facts as set forth by Defendant, except the insinuation that plaintiff had been systematically attempting
to turn the affections of the children away from their
mother; and plaintiff respectfully states there is nothing in the record to show that such was the case.
Defendant's attitude toward the children is shown
clearly where she stated on the stand that she knowingly
had the two minor children, Kim and Robyn, taken
from their warm bed while in the custody of their plaintiff father by the police and lodged in the Juvenile Detention Home as punishment for running away. (Tr
59, lines 17 through 30; Tr. 60, lines 1 through 30;
Tr. 61, lines 1 through 20; Tr. 57, lines 22 through 27.)
The facts further show that this treatment apparently
has marked the children substantially and that the
frightening and degrading experience will be long in
their memories. (Tr. 119, lines 6 through 19).
The facts further show there had been some conflict
in the home of defendant and her present husband, (Tr.
66, lines 13 through 19; Tr. 115, lines 19 through 30; Tr.
116, lines 1 through 30; Tr. 117, lines 1 through 30;
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rl'r. 118, lines 1 through 30.) wherein Kim had stated
that th•' home atmosphere was not one that represented
i1:qipiness; that there was some friction between defendant and her new husband and apparently no affection
shown to Kim or the younger brother, Robyn, by def endant's pret;ent husband to the point where Kim indicated
that it was impossible to live with mother any longer.
These factors explain the boys' strong desire to live
with their father, rather than any so-called systematic
scheme to alienate them from their mother. The two
minor boys had indicated throughout the case that they
both had affection for the both parents and that neither
parent had degraded the other during the course of
these events. Mrs. Andrews, the defendant, admitted
throughout her testimony that she knew of no attempt
of the children's father to alienate their affections from
her. Kim and Robyn have both indicated they could
no longer live with their mother and did in fact, as set
forth in Appellant's Statement of Facts, run away from
her because of these problems and their desire to live
with their father, who as a dentist has a warm and
adequate home for the children to live in; who has shown
a strong affection for the boys, taking them hunting,
fishing and boating and providing the boys with very
happy and harmonious home atmosphere. Kim indicated
his very strong desire to live with his father (Tr. 120,
lines 14 through 25.).
Throughout the proceedings the boys stated they
had gone on weekend trips with their father and continued their desire to do so, and the Court took away
this right for weekend skiing, boating and fishing trips
when defendant mother was granted visitation each
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and every weekend for each and every month
exception.

ARGUMENT
POIN'l' I.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN MAKING
AN ORDER CHANGlNG THE CUSTODY OF THE
MINOR CHILDREN FROM DEFENDANT MOTHER
TO PLAINTFF FATHER.
Throughout the hearings the children had continuously indicated their very strong desire to live with
their father rather than with their mother. The Court
heard testimony as set forth in the Statement of Facts to
the effect that the home atmosphere of defendant mother
and her present husband was one of, not just a little conflict, but apparently of some quite substantial conflict.
Kim, who is thirteen years old, had been induced to do
things, which were of a wrongful nature, by the older son
of defendant's present husband. All parties indicated that
defendant's present husband was a quiet, undemonstrative person who did not spend time with Kim and Robyn,
or his own youngsters for that matter. Kim and Robyn
felt uncomfortable in his household and felt that favoritism was shown to the cildren of defendant's present husband.
There was no showing that plaintiff could not
provide a suitable home, and the testimony showed, without doubt, that the home atmosphere with plaintiff
and his present wife was much happier, and that plaintiff's present wife had great affection for the children
of plaintiff, and that they had great fun together as
4

a f'arnily unit \Vith no conflicts. The evidence further
shews that the plaintiff spends much more time with
than did defendant's present husband,
l he
nna took them skiing, hunting and fishing, which was
not done while in defendant's home. Plaintiff is a
dentist and has a large home with enough rooms to
aecornmodate his own children and those of his present
wife.
These are the facts the Trial Court had before
it in awarding the custody of the minors to the plaintiff
and cross-appellant. The Court had the welfare of
the children as its prime consideration, and ample
evidence to sustain such findings that the welfare of
the children would be best served by changing custody
to their father.
The Court had before it the amended sections of
our statute concerning the disposition of children, as
follows: Laws of Utah, 1969--P. 320 and 330, § 30-3-5:
DISPOSITION OF PROPERTY AND CHILDREN.
"When a decree of divorce is made, the court
may make such orders in relation to the children,
property and parties, and the maintenance of the
parties and children, as may be equitable. The
court shall have continuing jurisdiction to make
such subsequent changes or new orders with
respect to the support and maintenance of the
parties, the custody of the children and their
support and maintenance, or the distribution of
the property as shall be reasonable and necessary."
5

30-3-10: CUSTODY OF' CHILDREN IN CASE
OF SEPARATION.
"In any case of separation of husband and wife
having minor children, or whenever a marriage
is declared void or dissolved the court shall make
such order for the future care and custody of the
minor children as it may deem just and proper.
In determining custody, the court shall consider
the best interests of the child and the past conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each
of the parties and the natural presumption that
the mother is best suited to care for young children. The court may inquire. of the children and
take into consideration the children's desires
regiarding the future custody; however, such
expressed desires shall not be controlling and
the court may, nevertheless, determine the children's custody otherwise."
As part of the determination of the lower court
as to what would be for the best interest of these minor
children the desires of the children must be given great
weight, and all of the cases cited by appellant in his
brief so indicate this to be the case.

It is interesting to note that in the case of Berkshire
v. Caley (1901), 157 Ind 1, 60 NE 696, the age of the
child was nine years. It is interesting to note also,
that in the case of Anderson v. Anderson (1937), 122
Conn. 600, 191 A 543, the age of the child involved was
seven years. In the case of Abair v. Everly (1959), 130
Ind. App. 192 NE2d 34, the children involved were
ages four and one-half and two and one-half. In the case
6

of L 1rscn v. Henrichs (1948), 239, Iowa 1009, 33 NW2d
2R8, <'c:stody of an eleven-year-old child was divided
the C'ontestant parties, the mother and the
grandmother. These cases all seem to indicate that as a
d1ild grows older and more mature more weight should be
gi','en to the wishes of said child. The Court seems to realize that as a male child becomes older he is more likely
to need the advice, counseling and companionship of his
father than his mother.
1

There have been many hearings in this case, the
Court has had ample opportunity to talk with the boys
and observe their desires in this respect, and the Court
has had ample opportunity to review the home life of
these youngsters, probably more so than in most cases.
It is evident from the history of the case and the testimony of Kim, (Tr. 120, lines 14 to 25; Tr. 112, lines
8 through 14.) this part of the Court's decision should
be affirmed. There is no showing by the defendant
there has been any reversible error or abuse of discretion.
There has been no affirmative showing that the Court
was wrong in its determination that the welfare of these
minor children would be best served by changing custody
to that of their father.

POINT II.
THAT THE COURT ERRED IN GRANTING
VISITA'l'ION RIGHTS TO THE DEFENDANT MOTHER FROM SATURDAY AT THE HOUR OF 6:00
O'CLOCK P.M. UNTIL THE FOLLOWING SUNDAY
NIGH'l' AT 9 :00 O'CLOCK P.M. FOR EACH AND
EVERY SA 'l'URDAY AND SUNDAY THEREAFTER.
If this order is permitted to stand, the plaintiff fath-
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er will not be able to take these young men with him on
weekend trips--hunting, fishing, skiing and boating. r_:-1<1
boys of these ages such recreational functions are extremely important. With the problems youngsters face,
in this day and age particularly, family activities of
this nature seem to become more and more important.
The testimony of the youngtsers in the course
of the numerous hearings clearly shows the importance to them of these family activities. Apparently,
very seldom did defendant and her present husband
take the boys on outings, and when they did take a trip
the atmosphere was not the happy, enjoyable, carefree
atmosphere they experienced when with plaintiff.
The lower Court apparently did not take into consideration the fact that plaintiff was working continually
during the week and the only time he has to spend with
the youngsters is after his work day is completed,
with no opportunity to visit with them and vacation with
them on weekends. If the lower Court's order is sustained there would be not one weekend during the whole
year that these youngsters and their father could vacation together. This would constitute a great hardship
upon plaintiff and his sons and is unreasonable under
the circumstances. It should be pointed out that such
weekend visitations would be reasonable if they were
restricted to one or two weekends each month with some
extended full week visitation with the defendant during
the summer months.

It should be noted further that such an unreason-

able visitation arrangement as is now in force, will
further alienate the youngsters' relationship with their
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where the youngsters' preferences have been
stated. Reference to the transcript clearly
,.:10\\'s that much of the conflict between the boys and
their mother arises out of her insistence that the boys
stay \vith her during the times specified, with unreasonable strictness, regardless of circumstances and factors
that would be more clearly to the benefit of the youngsters.

i:tt)t'·Pr,

CONCLUSIONS
Plaintiff and Cross-Appellant respectfully submits
that the order of the lower court transferring the
custody of the two minor sons to plaintiff was justified in all respects. l\Iany hearings were had before
the lower court and over a period of time the lower
court had ample apportunity to observe the boys, to
question the boys in chambers, outside of the presence
of all parties and counsel, and determine their wishes.
1'he Court had ample opportunity to determine the relationship of these boys with each of their parents and
spouses. The Court had ample opportunity to determine
the facilities able to be provided by each of the parents,
the home atmosphere of each of the parents, and has
ample and overwhelming evidence supporting conclusions
that it would be for the best interest of these youngsters to reside with their father. The only evidence
on the part of either parent that the home is not a suitable one is reference to the two sons of defendant's
present husband having instigated some wrongdoing
involving Kirn, but nothing on the part of plaintiff or
his present family along this line.
9

Visitation rights in the defendant are unfair and
unreasonable as they now stand, precluding pluintif;
from any vacation trips with the boys at all, which will
undoubtedly result in more and more animosity and
unhappiness between the minor sons and their mother.
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